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Abstract
The Outcomes Movement, also referred to as the “third revolution in medical care”
has focused attention and resources on assessing the e¤ectiveness of medical treat-
ments. Outcomes research aims at determining the nature of e¤ective treatment
regimes for medical conditions. Equipped with such information, health care pur-
chasers will be better able to regulate suppliers of health services. In this paper, we
consider whether payments conditioned on treatment delivered or on health outcome
obtained makes better use of the information provided by outcomes research. We
show that consumers can help third party purchasers allevaite incentive problems
due to asymmetric information. We …nd that, if patients in deciding whether to be
treated, are responsive to the treatments o¤ered payment-by results may be preferred.
We further …nd that where health care suppliers operate not-for-pro…t, there is an
incentive for purchasers to specify payment-by results.
JEL classi…cation: I11
Keywords: health, contracts, outcomes research, asymmetric information.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Arrow (1963), it has been widely held that suppliers
of health services are better informed regarding the e¤ectiveness of medical treatments
than either patients themselves or third party purchasers of health care and that this
adversely a¤ects the cost of health care provision. When the recipients of health
services are insulated from the cost of services by insurance, they have an incentive to
accept services provided only that those services yield some bene…t. Since suppliers
will deliver treatments provided that they are reimbursed for doing so, there is a
tendency for costly treatments of limited value to be provided. This emphasis on
the role of asymmetric information in increasing the costs of health care suggests
that better informed purchasers will be better able to control the costs of health care
by proscribing ine¤ective treatments. It is this premise that provides much of the
impetus for what has been termed the outcomes movement1.
The outcomes movement, which has also been referred to as the “Third Revolution
in Medical Care”2 (Relman, 1988), has attracted substantial government funding3,
generated intense debate in the medical profession (Epstein, 1990, Naylor, 1995, and
Tanenbaum, 1993) and continues to be a major priority in medical research. The
movement has two distinct aspects. First, outcomes research considers how an indi-
vidual’s health status, both prior to and following treatment can be measured4. This
1De…nitions of outcomes research and a discussion of the role that it plays in health policy debates
can be found in Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (1999) and UK Clearing House on
Health Outcomes (1999).
2According to Relman (1988), the …rst two ‘revolutions’ are the expansion of health services (in
the 1940s and 1950s) and the movement to contain costs (in the 1980s).
3In 1989 the federal Agency for Health Care Policy Research was set up in the US, explicitly
committed to conduct and disseminate outcomes research. In the British National Health Service
outcomes research is central to the process of Clinical Audit (for which health providers receive a
speci…c budget) and Evidence Based Medicine (Whynes, 1996).
4Published outcomes research provides many indications of this focus. For exam-
ple, papers from the Centre for Health Quality, Outcomes and Economic Research
(http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/chqoer/about.htm) contain the following: ‘Our objective was to develop
a patient-based measure of the severity of osteoarthritis of the knee focusing on symptomatology,
that may be used in conjunction with measures of health-related quality of life in monitoring the
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research has emphasized that health status is multi-dimensional and that measures
of health status vary from one medical condition to another. Second, the outcomes
movement is concerned with understanding the impact of di¤erent treatments on
improvements in health status5. This activity has centered on the collection and
analysis of large data sets where information on changes in health status, together
with information on treatments undertaken is recorded and analyzed. Proponents of
this research see it as establishing the proper basis for measuring medical output6
and, hence, claim that it will “bring order and predictability” (Ellwood, 1988) to
health care systems. The rationale for such claims has a basis in economic analysis
because if the outcomes research program succeeds in isolating the medically e¤ective
treatments for a range of conditions, it will provide purchasers of health services with
additional information that can be used to better specify the reimbursement of health
care suppliers.
In this paper we consider how purchasers of health services can make the best use
of outcomes research in formulating their purchasing arrangements on the assumption
that there is irreducible asymmetric information between purchasers and suppliers.
Such asymmetry of information, which results in the need to pay rents to suppliers,
seems inevitable. Indeed, disquiet with outcomes research in the medical profession
health status of outpatients.’ and ‘We developed a symptom-based measure of severity for chronic
lung disease(CLD) that can be readily administered in ambulatory care settings and be used to sup-
plement general health-related quality of life (HRQoL) assessments and pathophysiologic indicators
in research and clinical care.’
5See, for example, Tanenbaum (1993) who comments on the Medical Treatment E¤ectiveness
Program: ‘This program di¤ers from earlier e¤orts in its focus on medical e¤ectiveness and its
sponsorship of large-scale statistical studies of both common and alternative treatments for speci…c
conditions. It is a part of what has been called the “health-outcomes strategy”’
6This can be thought of as follows. Suppose that medical intervention has the e¤ect of moving
an individual from one health state to another. Since the outcome of treatment is never certain, the
most that one can hope to learn is the probability of a particular treatment e¤ecting a particular
transition for a particular kind of ailment. Put this way the outcomes movement has as its objective
the determination of the values in a set of Markov transition matrices describing movements be-
tween health states. The outcomes movement is both concerned with determining the appropriate
labelling of the rows and columns of these transition matrices and with establishing the values of
the probabilities themselves. If knowledge were ever to be complete, an individual patient could be
described in terms of which transition matrices corresponded to their medical condition.
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has centered on a concern that the knowledge of a particular patient acquired by
a physician will always go beyond what can be described in terms of a patient’s
diagnosis and current health state7.
If reliable data is available on health states, suppliers’ payments can be based on
such data as now happens in the case of some health services (Lu, 1999). In short, out-
comes research facilitates ‘payment-by-results’ which might be used to elicit suppliers’
hidden information. Alternatively, purchasers could use outcomes research to specify
acceptable treatments and specify ‘payment-by-treatment’. In this paper we compare
the e¢cacy, in terms of reducing informational rents, of these alternatives. Hence-
forth, we refer to payment that is conditioned on what treatment achieves in terms
of improving a patients’ health as outcome-based and payment that is conditioned on
the treatment given8, as treatment-based. We show that the choice between basing
payment on treatment or outcome depends on the cost of treatment, the attitude
of suppliers to their patients and crucially on the extent to which patient-consumers
respond to variations in the treatment o¤ered when deciding where or whether to
seek treatment.
The idea that patients who have a long term relationship with a physician or who
receive information from friends regarding the treatment that is given by a particular
supplier can be expected to choose where to be treated, or in the case of elective
treatments whether to be treated at all, has been an important aspect of the analysis
of health contracts. Previously, such a demand response on the part of patients
has been identi…ed as a potentially important incentive instrument in mitigating the
7Tanenbaum (1993) argues that: “The knowledge that a procedure is more or less e¤ective overall
should not be confused with the knowledge of whether or how to use that procedure in caring
e¤ectively for the next patient. Whereas economists and clinical epidemiologists of the outcomes
movement seek better clinical practice grounded in the objective certainties of statistical rigor, other
students of medicine believe uncertainty and subjectivity are at the heart of the clinical encounter
and insist that it will always be the case.”
8Payments which are treatment speci…c are already used in some health care systems. McClellan
(1997), for example, details examples of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) in the US Medicare
system which vary not according to the diagnosis but with the treatment given.
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e¤ects of moral hazard in health contracts; see for example Ma and McGuire (1997),
Ma (1994), and Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a, 1998b, 2000).
We …nd that demand e¤ects also help to align incentives by reducing provider rents
due to asymmetric information. In addition, we show that outcome-based payment
is more e¤ective in utilizing patients’ demand response. Therefore, when demand is
particularly responsive, for example, for elective procedures, payment schemes based
on outcome reduce the cost of health services relative to payment schemes based on
treatment. We show that this is because payment based on outcomes makes misrep-
resentation of patient-type more costly to a supplier in terms of demand e¤ect since
treatments have to be tailored to patient-type such that the outcome is consistent
with what is claimed.
These …ndings have a number of policy implications. First, they make clear the
factors that in‡uence the choice of health contracts in the light of greater medical
knowledge and they provide insights into how health contracts can best be tailored to
make use of that knowledge. Second they con…rm the view that informed consumers
have an important role to play in aiding third party purchasers control the costs
of health services and therefore provide guidance as to where resources, targeted at
improving consumers’ information, might be best deployed.
The seminal work by Maskin and Riley (1985) establishes the theoretical frame-
work concerning the choice of monitoring instruments in contracts with asymmetric
information which is the foundation of this paper. Some recent contributions to
that literature are Khalil and Lawarrée (1995), and Lewis and Sappington (1995).
Our paper contributes to that literature as the results that we derive can be applied
whenever a principal, who is a third party payer, contracts with a privately informed
agent who faces a demand that is sensitive to the e¤ort expended in production. The
central insight we o¤er is that, with asymmetric information, demand responsiveness
leads to an optimal contract in which payment is conditioned on the value of output
4
rather than e¤ort input.
In the context of health care, asymmetric information regarding patient types of
the kind that we consider here has featured in the work of Dranove (1987), Allen and
Gertler (1991), Ma (1994), and Ellis and McGuire (1986). In this literature the focus
is upon the e¤ect of using a single payment to cover patients of di¤erent types with
a view to examining the incentives generated by prospective payment systems as an
alternative to cost reimbursement in health care markets. In contrast to these papers,
the present paper considers how a purchaser may best …ne tune payments so as to
ensure that di¤erent types of patients receive the kind of treatment that is e¢cient for
them. The alternatives with a single payment covering multiple types are either that
some patients are not treated (or dumped in the terminology of Ma (1994)) or that
suppliers earn excessive pro…ts by choosing to treat easier patients, a process referred
to as cream-skimming. Without the information that will (hopefully) be provided
by outcomes research, a purchaser has little option but to choose between dumping
or cream skimming. Hence, our approach is predicated on purchasers having more
detailed information and considers how that information might best be used. Lewis
and Sappington (1999) adopt an approach that is similar to the one pursued in this
paper to address a di¤erent question, that of how information acquisition by suppliers
a¤ects the form of the optimal contract.
The organization of the paper is as follows. A model of health service provision
with private information is presented in section 2. The optimal contract under full
information is derived in section 3. In sections 4 and 5, we study the case of treatment-
based and outcome-based payments, and compare the two in section 6, where the
main result of the paper is presented. We consider supplier altruism in section 7 and
discuss the results and their implications for health care policy in section 8.
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2 The Model
We consider a purchaser who contracts with a health care supplier, which for con-
venience we refer to as the hospital, in order to ensure the provision of treatment
of patients with a particular medical condition and a given health status prior to
treatment.9 Patients may be one of two types, which we denote by Á 2 fÁg; Ábg
where Ág > Áb: A patient of type Ág is a good prospect for treatment and will re-
spond well to treatment and be cheap to treat. In the terminology of Whynes (1996),
a treatment is both medically e¤ective and cost e¤ective for type Ág; whereas the
opposite is true for type Áb. The purchaser, hospital and individuals all share the
same ex ante assessment of the probability of a patient’s type, where Pr[Á = Ág] = ¼
and Pr[Á = Áb] = 1¡ ¼: An individual’s type depends on the precise nature of their
condition as can be determined solely by a physician, and is therefore unknown to
either the purchaser or the individual. A patient’s type is, however, discovered by
the hospital at the onset of treatment and, hence, there is asymmetric information10.
For each patient, the hospital determines an intensity of treatment11, which we
denote by x: A type-Á patient given a treatment of intensity x will have a gain in
health status12 of h, which is a random variable distributed with density f(h j x; Á);
whose support is independent of x and Á; and has a mean increasing in x and Á:
The purchaser attaches a monetary value v(h) to the gain in health status h, and
the purchaser’s expected bene…t is given by b(x; Á) ´ R v(h)f(h j x; Á)dh:We assume
9For the purposes of exposition we consider a medical condition of a given severity. In practice, a
contract could be written to cover both a diagnosis and severity of condition. Hence one diagnosis
could give rise to many conditions being contracted for.
10An alternative interpretation of asymmetric information in this context is that that there are
not su¢cient risk adjusters to fully re‡ect the di¤erences between patients.
11For convenience we consider treatment intensity as a scalar quantity. Intensity can also be
thought of as an index of a multidimensional vector that characterizes a particular medical inter-
vention. Provided that the di¤erent dimensions of treatment occur in …xed proportions the analysis
is una¤ected. When there are truly multi-dimensional aspects to a hospital’s decisions then new
issues arise of the kind discussed in Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a).
12We treat h as a scalar purely for convenience. It is straightforward to allow for a vector of
characteristics representing an individual’s health status.
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that b(x; Á) is increasing and concave in x; increasing in Á and such that the marginal
expected bene…t of treatment is non-decreasing in Á. These assumptions ensure that
the purchaser’s expected bene…t function is well behaved and meet the requirements
that treatment is more e¤ective for good types. We assume that the cost of treating
a patient of type Á with intensity x can be written as c(x; Á) and assume that c(:) is
increasing and convex in x; decreasing in Á and that the marginal cost of treatment
is non-increasing in Á: Again, these assumptions ensure that costs are well-behaved
and meet the requirements of treatment being less costly for good types. We assume
that c(x; Á); which we take to be the true economic cost of treatment, cannot be
observed by the purchaser. This is consistent with, for example, …nancial costs being
observable but there being elements of cost that are not reported and are private
information to the hospital. We also assume the necessary Inada conditions so that
we obtain positive but bounded values for choice variables at the optimum.
Our model of demand response by patients follows that of Ma andMcGuire (1997).
Long-term relationships between hospitals and patients or information from friends
allows individuals to form an assessment of the intensity of treatment that is on o¤er
from the hospital. Since more intense treatments increase health status, patients will
choose where to be treated, or in the case of elective procedures whether to be treated
at all, according to this assessment of treatment intensity. We therefore assume that
demand is a function of the intensity of treatment that individuals expect13 and
that individuals prior to their own treatment have an unbiased signal of the average
intensity of treatment they will receive if treated. Hence, if good types are treated
with intensity xg and bad types with intensity xb each patient anticipates that they
will receive treatment of expected intensity ¹x = ¼xg+(1¡¼)xb. We suppose that the
total number of patients who wish to be treated is an increasing function of expected
13This, in common with much of the literature on health contracts, presumes that the health
treatments being considered have the attributes of search goods.
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intensity ¹x; and so denote total expected demand14 for treatment as n(x(xg; xb));
with n0(¹x) ¸ 0: The special case in which n0 = 0 corresponds to patients who are
either ignorant of the treatment intensity that they will receive or cannot respond to
changes in expected intensity, e.g., because of medical emergencies. Since patients do
not know their type, n(:) is independent of Á:
We assume initially that the hospital operates “for pro…t” but consider in section
7 the implications of the hospital having a concern for its patients. Since the hospital
observes patients’ types it can choose treatments conditional on type. A treatment
policy for the hospital consists of a (possibly) type contingent treatment intensity for
each patient which we write as fxg; xbg. The hospital’s treatment policy determines
both the revenue and cost of each patient treated and expected demand.
Under what we call treatment-based payment, the transfer that the purchaser
makes to the hospital depends on the distribution of types announced, which is
checked ex post by verifying if the claimed treatments were provided. The purchaser
pays pgt for a patient claimed to be of type Ág, i.e., when treatment xgt is given, and it
pays pbt when a patient is claimed to be of type Áb or for treatment of xbt. We assume
that the purchaser is able to impose a su¢cient sanction such that the hospital has
an incentive to provide the treatment it claims to have given to each patient.
Under what we call outcome-based payment, the transfer that the purchaser makes
to the hospital again depends on the claimed distribution of types, but in this case
claims are veri…ed by establishing the health gain (i.e. the outcome) of a sample
of patients treated perhaps using observable signals of health status. Hence, the
purchaser pays pgo when a patient is claimed to be of type Ág and it pays pbo for a
patient claimed to be of type Áb. If, for example, the hospital claims that a proportion
1¡ ¼R of patients were type Áb the purchaser can check whether the average health
gain corresponds to h(¼R) ´ ¼R R hf(h j xgo; Ág)dh + (1 ¡ ¼R) R hf(h j xbo; Áb)dh;
14Random demand will make it infeasible to base penalties on the number of patients treated.
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where the treatment intensities correspond with those that the hospital is required to
provide for each type. We assume that there are su¢cient numbers of patients treated
and sampled such that the purchaser can verify the hospital’s claim by evaluating the
average health gain achieved. Again, we assume that the purchaser is able to impose
su¢cient sanction such that the veri…ed health gains will indeed correspond to the
claims made by the hospital.
To isolate the incentive e¤ects of each payment scheme we further assume that
payment is based on either treatment alone or on outcome alone but that the costs
of implementing payment are the same in each case. This is equivalent to assum-
ing that there is a given …xed cost of setting up a monitoring system necessary to
verify a hospital’s claims for payment, but that instituting a system to verify both
treatment and outcomes is prohibitively expensive. In practice the cost of verifying
outcomes or treatments could be di¤erent but the implications are obvious. If both
treatment and outcome could be observed in our model, it is equivalent to observing
a patient’s type, and the …rst best (net of veri…cation cost) can be implemented. In
practice the purchaser-supplier relationship is complex so that purchasers would not
eliminate asymmetry of information even if they pursue elements of both treatment
and outcome veri…cation. In practice purchasers may, therefore, want to incorporate
both in their reimbursement systems. Our analysis acts as a guide to the relative
merits of each payment system by focusing on the incentive e¤ects of one instrument
at a time.
The timing of events that we assume is as follows: the purchaser designs a contract
under which the hospital will be rewarded for each person treated subject either to
veri…cation by monitoring of treatments given or of outcomes achieved. Prior to
receiving treatment, individuals receive a signal (the average intensity of treatment)
and decide on the basis of that signal whether or not to be treated. Those deciding to
be treated then go to the hospital and receive treatment, and the purchaser assesses
9
either the intensity of treatment that a patient undergoes or the outcome of treatment.
The hospital is then paid according to its contract with the purchaser.
3 Full Information
If there is full information on patient types, the purchaser can condition payment







+ (1¡ ¼) (b(xb; Áb)¡ pb)
i
; (1)
where pg, pb denote transfers paid by the purchaser for, respectively, good and bad
type patients. The purchaser needs to ensure that the hospital is willing to provide
the necessary treatment to each type and so must ensure that the hospital makes
a non-negative return on each type of patient to avoid ‘dumping’16. We therefore
consider the individual rationality constraints:
pg ¡ c(xg; Ág) ¸ 0; (IRg)
pb ¡ c(xb; Áb) ¸ 0: (IRb)
The purchaser’s problem is to maximize the objective function (1) subject to IRg
and IRb: Since in (1) any transfer that the purchaser makes to the hospital subtracts
from its welfare, the two constraints are binding, and we can substitute for pg and pb
and solve for an unconstrained optimum17. To simplify notation, we de…ne expected
15For expositional simplicity we assume that the purchaser is concerned with the health gains of
patients but does not attach any weight to the hospital’s pro…t. Our qualitative results are preserved
if the “cost of public funds” approach, as in La¤ont and Tirole (1993), is used instead.
16See Lewis and Sappington (1999) and Ma (1994) for more on dumping and cream skimming.
McClellan (1997) provides evidence that diagnostic related groups (DRG) are often de…ned to ac-
commodate exceptional cases with high treatment cost in order to avoid dumping.
17The program de…ned by maximizing (1) subject to IRg and IRb is assumed to be well behaved
with a unique optimum. In the absence of the function n(:); concavity of b(:) and convexity of c(:)
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b(xg; Ág)¡ c(xg; Ág)
´
+ (1¡ ¼) (b(xb; Áb)¡ c(xb; Áb)) (2)
and write the purchaser’s objective function as
W (xg; xb)
def
= n(¹x)S(xg; xb): (3)
Denoting partial derivatives by subscripts and the derivative of demand with respect
to average intensity by n0, the …rst best treatment intensities are the solutions to the
























¤) [bx(x¤b ; Áb)¡ cx(x¤b ; Áb)] = 0; (5)
where ¹x¤ denotes ¹x evaluated at …rst best treatment intensities. These two conditions
illustrate the e¤ects of demand on optimal treatment intensities. Since demand is
increasing in treatment intensities, the …rst-best intensity of treatment for each type
is extended beyond that which makes marginal bene…t equal marginal cost for a given
patient. The extent of this excess of treatment (over that which would prevail in
the absence of patients responding to treatment intensity by demanding treatment)
is captured by the terms involving n0: The …rst order conditions also make clear,
given our assumptions on b(:) and c(:); that a good type will receive more intensive
treatment than a bad type in the …rst best, i.e. x¤g > x
¤
b :
For future reference it is useful to note that, with n00 · 0; the cross partial
would ensure a well-behaved program. However, an increase in treatment increases demand and
if this e¤ect is strong enough, we could have an unbounded solution. Therefore, we are assuming
that the properties of n(:) do not invalidate the convexity of the program implied by standard






b) is negative. This follows because an increase in the treatment inten-
sity o¤ered to bad types decreases average surplus S(:) and reduces the value on the
margin from treating good types since net marginal bene…t is negative at the …rst
best treatment. By symmetry, Wbg(x¤g; x
¤
b) < 0 and the same argument applies.
4 Treatment-based payment
We now consider asymmetric information where the purchaser chooses to observe the
treatments provided but not the patient’s type nor the health status improvement
due to treatment. The payment to the hospital is a function of treatment, and the
contract o¤ered to the hospital is fpgt;pbt; xgt;xbtg: The optimal contract is the solution


















pbt ¡ c(xbt; Ág)
i
; (6)
pbt ¡ c(xbt; Áb) ¸ 0: (7)
The …rst constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint for a good type. It
ensures that the hospital cannot gain by treating good type patients as if they were
bad. The second constraint is the individual rationality constraint applying to bad
type patients. There are two other constraints: the incentive constraint for a bad
type, and individual rationality constraint for a good type. Neither are included in
the de…nition of Pt because, as is typical in models of this type, they are not binding
in equilibrium. It can be easily veri…ed that the optimal contract satis…es the omitted
constraints as inequalities.
The two constraints (6) and (7) will hold as equalities since the payment to the
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hospital can otherwise be lowered to the purchaser’s bene…t. The left hand side of (6)
measures the total rent that the hospital will earn under a treatment-based payment.
Substituting from (7) into the right hand side of (6) and imposing equality, we can
obtain an expression for this rent18 as:
Rt(xbt) = n(¹x(xbt; xbt))
h




In the solution19 of the second best problem the purchaser must pay the hospital
transfers which exceed the cost of treatment in order to ensure that the hospital
has an incentive to o¤er appropriate treatments to each type of patient. The net
value of these transfers is given by (8). The following proposition makes precise
which patients a hospital will earn rents on, and the implications of these rents for
treatment intensities. In the proposition and subsequently, we use ~¢ to denote second
best treatment intensities.
Proposition 1 The hospital receives rent from treating good type patients but none
for treating bad types. There is under-provision of treatment intensity for bad types i.e.
~xbt < x
¤
b ; and good types always receive higher intensity than bad types i.e. ~xgt > ~xbt:
It is ambiguous whether there will be over or under-provision of treatment intensity
(relative to the …rst-best) for good types.
Proof. In appendix
The nature of the distortions in treatment intensities can be understood by ex-
amining the e¤ect of xbt on the expected rent R(xbt). Since the cost di¤erential
18The inequality below requires xbt > 0, but that will be true in equilibrium.
19To ensure a well behaved program under asymmetric information, it is su¢cient to assume that
n00(:) is small, or not too negative, in addition to assumptions made under full information. This
additional assumption makes rent convex in xb:
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h
c(xbt; Áb)¡ c(xbt; Ág)
i
increases with xbt; the expected rent increases with xbt: There-
fore, the purchaser will want to lower xbt from the …rst best amount in order to reduce
expected rent. But, this can imply that xgt will be greater than in the …rst best even
though Rt(:) is independent of xgt: Consider an example where ¼ is very small. In
that case, ~xbt is close to but smaller than x¤b ; and we already know from the analysis of
the full-information problem that Wgb(x¤g; x
¤
b) < 0: Since Wgg < 0 by assumption, for
~xbt close to but smaller than x¤b ; we must have ~xgt > x
¤
g: In general, however, Wgb(:)
is ambiguous, and there may be under-provision of intensity to the good types.
Since ~xgt > ~xbt, demand responsiveness acts as a disciplining device because, as
can be seen from expression (8), as the hospital adjusts treatment so as to elicit
higher payment it must do so in a way that will cause consumers to abstain from
being treated, which lowers total rent.
5 Outcome-based payment
Outcomes based payment imposes a constraint on the treatments that the hospital
must give if it is to misreport patient types but satisfy ex post veri…cation. If the
hospital wants to misrepresent a good type as bad, it must provide a good type with
an intensity of treatment such that the expected health gain is the same as if the
patient was a bad type. Speci…cally, this intensity of treatment is
x^bo = x^(xbo; Ág; Áb); (9)
de…ned by Z
hf(h j xbo; Áb)dh def=
Z
hf(h j x^bo; Ág)dh: (10)
14



















pbo ¡ c(x^bo; Ág)
i
; (11)
pbo ¡ c(xbo; Áb) ¸ 0; (12)
As in the previous section, the …rst constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint
for a good type, and the second is the individual rationality constraint when the type
is bad. Also as previously, the other incentive constraint and individual rationality
constraint, which are satis…ed as inequalities in equilibrium, are omitted.
The two constraints must be binding, otherwise the purchaser can lower pgo and
pbo to his bene…t. Applying the same method as used in the section on treatment-
based payment the rent the hospital will earn under a second best outcome-based
contract can be written
Ro(xbo) = n(¹x(x^bo; xbo))
h





Proposition 2 The hospital receives rent from treating good type patients but none
for treating bad types. There is under-provision of treatment intensity for bad types i.e.
~xbo < x
¤
b ; and good types always receive higher intensity than bad types i.e. ~xgo > ~xbo:
It is ambiguous whether there will be over or under-provision of treatment intensity
(relative to the …rst-best) for good types:
Proof. In appendix.
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The explanation of this proposition follows that given in the case of treatment-
based payment.
6 Comparing treatment and outcome-based pay-
ments
Under both the payment systems discussed above, the purchaser pays the hospital
a rent on account of asymmetric information. The di¤erent payment schemes have
di¤erent implications for the treatments that patients receive but there is always
under-treatment for bad types relative to the …rst best and may be either under- or
over-treatment of good types. The precise extent of the distortions that arise from
information asymmetry will vary according to functional form and parameters. Here
we are concerned with the relative cost to the purchaser of adopting treatment or
outcome-based payments as that is measured in the rent required to implement a
particular set of treatment intensities. Speci…cally we are concerned with knowing
whether one form of payment system dominates the other. The following proposition
provides the details.
Proposition 3 For any pair of treatment intensities (xg; xb) that are to be imple-
mented under treatment-based payment, outcome-based payment will implement those
intensities at a lower overall cost to the purchaser if: n(¹x(xb; xb))
h





c(xb; Áb)¡ c(x^b; Ág)
i
; where x^b is obtained by substituting xb for xbt in
(9).
Proof. Consider the pair of treatment intensities (xg; xb) that are to be implemented
under treatment-based payment, and de…ne by the pair (pgt; pbt) the minimum trans-
fers needed to implement them. Using the constraints (7) and (6), we have
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pbt = c(xb; Áb); (14)




c(xb; Áb)¡ c(xb; Ág)
i
: (15)
We de…ne by (pgo; pbo) the pair of (minimum) transfers that implement the pair
of intensities (xg; xb) under outcome based payment. They satisfy
pbo = c(xb; Áb); (16)




c(xb; Áb)¡ c(x^b; Ág)
i
: (17)








c(xb; Áb)¡ c(x^b; Ág)
i
: (18)
The result follows from a comparison of rents under the two payment schemes.
Rents in both treatment and outcome-based cases have similar features. In both cases
the cost di¤erential of providing treatment to a good type and receiving reimburse-
ment as if the type was bad, and the drop in demand due to lower treatment intensity
…gure as determinants of rent. There are, however, signi…cant di¤erences. Since with
outcome-based payment, xb is larger than x^b(xb; Áb; Ág); the cost di¤erential is larger
in this case, but the drop in demand is also larger. The …rst e¤ect is illustrated in
Figure 1. In the Figure, the rent per good type patient under treatment-based pay-
ment (denoted Rt=n) is less than the rent per patient under outcome-based payment
(denoted Ro=n). The di¤erence will be greater the larger is the discrepancy be-
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tween xb and bxb and the greater is the discrepancy in the marginal cost of treatment
intensity. Whilst the per person rent is higher under outcome-based payment the
number of patients determining total rent is lower by an extent that depends upon
demand responsiveness. Hence greater demand responsiveness reduces rent under
outcome-based payment relative to treatment-based payment. Intuitively, if demand
responsiveness is strong enough, the purchaser will prefer an outcome-based system
over a treatment-based one.
The condition in Proposition 3 depends on three things. The extent of the di¤er-
ence between the outcome of treatment to good and bad types determines the extent
to which xb is greater than x^b: The responsiveness of demand to variations in average
treatment intensity determines, for any given di¤erence between x^b and xb; the extent
to which n(¹x(xb; xb)) is greater than n(¹x(x^b; xb)): Finally, the curvature of the good
type’s cost function determines the magnitude of
c(xb; Áb)¡ c(xb; Ág) < c(xb; Áb)¡ c(x^b; Ág):
The interaction between these three e¤ects is complex. However, when there is a
negligible impact of variations in treatment intensity of good types on the cost asso-
ciated with their treatment, the condition is almost certainly satis…ed. We therefore,
have as a limiting case:
Corollary 4 If cx(x; Ág) = 0 (for all x) outcome-based payment results in a lower
overall cost to the purchaser than treatment-based payment.
Proof. It follows from (18) by using xb > x^b and cx(x; Ág) = 0 (for all x):
It is also possible to consider circumstances under which the condition will not be
satis…ed. The most obvious case being where average treatment intensity does not
impact on demand. Therefore,
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Corollary 5 If n0(:) ´ 0 and cx(x; Ág) > 0; the cost to the purchaser of treatment-
based payment is lower than the cost of outcome-based payment.
Proof. Follows from (18) by setting n(¹x(xb; xb) = n(¹x(x^b; xb)):
These results indicate in what ways di¤erences in demand and cost will in‡u-
ence the optimal form of payment by purchasers. Di¤erent medical conditions vary
both in the extent to which patients are aware of the treatment they will receive and
the extent to which patients can be expected to respond to variations in treatment,
and will be characterized by di¤erent marginal costs of treatment intensity. Where
patients perceive and respond to intensity of treatment, as is likely to be the case
for elective procedures, the analysis suggests that even if purchasers are equipped
with a detailed knowledge of what treatments are e¤ective for each medical condi-
tion they may still wish to monitor the e¤ectiveness of treatment for themselves and
condition payment on what they observe. For medical conditions such as, for exam-
ple, emergency treatments, where there is little exercise of choice by patients (and,
hence n0(:) ¼ 0) the analysis indicates that purchasers will do better by conditioning
payment on the treatments given.
7 Altruism
The analysis above assumes that the hospital maximizes pro…t which is at odds with
the empirical evidence, such as that presented by Dranove and White (1994), which
indicates that not all hospitals are pro…t maximizers. In a not-for-pro…t hospital it
has been argued that treatment intensity may be of intrinsic concern to the supplier
– see, for example, Newhouse (1970). We capture the potential concern that a hos-
pital might have for its patients by considering the hospital as having an altruistic20
20The formulation of altruism that we use presumes that there is a limit on the ability of a hospital
to …nance the treatments it provides out of the altruistic bene…t it enjoys. If that were not the case,
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component to its objective function of A(x; Á) =
R
a(h)f(h j x; Á)dh; where a(h) is
the hospital’s valuation of h. We assume that a(h) < v(h), so that the hospital does
not fully re‡ect the purchaser’s concerns for patient welfare and that A(:) has the
same curvature properties as b(:):
Under full information, the e¤ect of altruism is to improve the purchaser’s welfare
because by relying on the hospital’s concern for its patients, the purchaser can reduce
its payment to the hospital for any chosen treatment intensities. The purchaser’s
objective function continues to be given by (1) whilst the constraints IRg and IRb
need to be modi…ed to re‡ect the fact that the prices pg; pb do not have to cover the
entire cost of treatment. Therefore, the constraints become
pi ¡ c(xi; Ái) +A(xi; Ái) ¸ 0;
for i = g; b: Under full information the payment for each type can be reduced by
the full amount of altruistic bene…t, which implies that the full-information level of
treatment intensities will be higher than in the absence of altruism.
Under asymmetric information, the e¤ect of altruism is more complex. The al-
truistic bene…t that the hospital enjoys is private information and therefore provides
a source of informational rent. When a good type is claimed to be bad and given a
treatment of xb; the bene…t from altruism is A(xb; Ág); which is strictly greater than
A(xb; Áb): Since the payment pb must account for altruistic bene…t of the amount
A(xb; Áb); the hospital can retain some of the bene…t when treating good types,
speci…cally (A(xb; Ág)¡A(xb; Áb)) per patient. Hence, the purchaser cannot take full
advantage of the a hospital’s altruism when there is asymmetric information about
patient type.
the purchaser could rely on the goodwill of the hospital to ensure that treatments were carried out
without the need for payment.
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More pertinent to our analysis, altruism will bias the purchaser towards outcome-
based payment. The reason is as follows. Under outcome-based payment, in order
to misreport a good type as bad, the good type must be treated with lower intensity
(bxbo) than a bad type (xbo) and hence the amount of altruistic bene…t that a hospital
can retain is smaller. This implies that the price of treatment can be lowered more
under outcome-based than under treatment-based payment.
8 Discussion
If the outcomes research program succeeds in isolating the medically e¤ective treat-
ments for a range of conditions, it will provide purchasers of health services with
additional information that can be used to better specify the reimbursement of health
care suppliers. In this context, we have considered the relative merits of treatment-
based and outcome-based payments when there is irreducible asymmetric information
regarding the precise medical condition of a patient. With such asymmetric infor-
mation the cost to the purchaser of ensuring the provision of treatment cannot be
driven down to the cost of providing that treatment because there is informational
rent. However, we have shown that outcome and treatment-based payment schemes
di¤er in their ability to contain this additional cost of health care.
In our model treatment based payments have the advantage that they place a
tighter constraint on the supplier’s choice of treatment and therefore, a priori, would
appear to be preferable. However, the analysis indicates that there is an important
role for the information that consumers have regarding the nature of medical inter-
ventions speci…cally when consumers use this information to decide whether to be
treated. With consumers whose demand is responsive to treatment, a supplier of
services that adjusts treatment so as to elicit higher payment must do so in a way
that will cause consumers to abstain from being treated. This abstention hurts the
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supplier and can best be exploited by a purchaser by making payment depend on
outcomes. Hence we conclude that the greater is the demand response on the part
of patients the more likely it is for the purchaser to prefer outcome-based payment.
A similar argument applies if the supplier is concerned per se with the treatment
that they o¤er, perhaps because they value the health gain enjoyed by the patients
that they treat. Then, a purchaser can again use outcome-based payment to impose
a greater penalty on the supplier who distorts the treatment they o¤er in order to
elicit higher payment. Clearly, other factors in‡uence the choice of outcome versus
treatment-based payment and the analysis shows that costs of treatment have an
important role to play. The relative advantage of outcome-based payment increases
the smaller is the marginal cost of treatment for those patients who are easy to treat
and bene…t most from treatment.
Our analysis has a number of implications for health care policy. The emergence
of new knowledge regarding the e¤ectiveness of medical treatments is trumpeted
as paving the way for improvements in health care systems. By considering how
outcomes research might be used in structuring health contracts, our research begins
the process of examining the way in which improvements might be implemented. In
our analysis outcomes research will reduce the cost of health services as borne by
third party purchasers. But the analysis suggests that if the reduction in cost is to
be as great as possible, purchasers will need to consider carefully how they base their
payments – in particular whether payment is conditioned on the treatment given or
the outcome achieved. The research further indicates those factors that will be crucial
in making this choice and that the choice will vary according to the kinds of health
services that are being purchased, the objectives of suppliers and the extent to which
consumers are well-informed about treatments on o¤er. Consistent with other studies
of health contracts that have focussed on moral hazard issues, we …nd that the role
of consumers who respond by demanding treatment according to their perceptions of
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the treatment that is on o¤er, is crucial. Our research, therefore, complements those
studies of health contracts under moral hazard by suggesting an equivalent role for
informed consumers in mitigating the e¤ects of asymmetric information and suggests
that policy directed at providing consumers with better information may be valuable
in containing the costs of health care.
In practice, treatment-based and outcome-based payments schemes will require
very di¤erent methods of implementation. For a treatment-based payment, the pur-
chaser will need to monitor treatments actually given so as to ensure that these meet
the requirements of payment. Whilst this may be di¢cult and hence costly, the
problems encountered would appear less than when it is necessary to monitor health
outcomes. Outcomes research is still at a formative stage and there is as yet no clear
consensus on what the relevant dimensions of outcome measurement are – at least
not for the great majority of health interventions. We have not in this paper con-
sidered these practical issues, which will require further research before outcome or
treatment-based payments schemes can be e¤ectively implemented. This observation
does not however preclude the value of exploring under precisely which conditions
outcome-based payment might be bene…cial and it is in that spirit that we present
our results in the context of contracts for health services.
The central insight of our analysis also carries across to di¤erent contractual set-
tings. Away from the application to health markets considered here, the approach
that we adopt can be applied whenever a principal who is a third party payer con-
tracts with an agent who faces a demand for their goods or services that is sensitive
to the e¤ort expended in production. The central insight o¤ered here is that demand
responsiveness on the part of consumers leads a principal towards monitoring the
value of output rather than the monitoring of e¤ort inputs.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. The result on rents follow from the binding constraints (6) and (7). Using
the de…nitions of S(:) from (2), rent from (8), and the fact that (6) and (7) hold as
equalities, we can rewrite the purchaser’s problem as the unconstrained problem,
max
xgt;xbt
[n(¹x(xgt; xbt))S(xgt; xbt)¡ ¼Rt(xbt)] ; (19)
or, by the de…nition of W (:) from (3),
max
xgt;xbt
[W (xgt; xbt)¡ ¼Rt(xbt)] :
The …rst order conditions de…ning the optimal choices can be written,
Wg(~xgt; ~xbt) = 0; (20)
Wb(~xgt; ~xbt)¡ ¼R0t(~xbt) = 0 (21)
where, using ~¢ to denote a function or derivative evaluated at the second best choices
of treatment intensities ~xgt; ~xbt, we have
Wg(xgt; xbt) = ~n
0¼ ~S + ¼~n
³
bx(~xgt; Ág)¡ cx(~xgt; Ág)
´
;
Wb(xgt; xbt) = n
0(1¡ ¼) ~S + ~n(1¡ ¼) (bx(~xbt; Áb)¡ cx(~xbt; Áb)) :
Condition (20) implies that bx(~xgt; Ág)¡cx(~xgt; Ág) < 0; and we know from the de…ni-
tion of Rt(:) that R0t(~xbt) > 0 since n(¹x(xbt; xbt)) and
h





I) ~xbt < ~xgt : The …rst order conditions (20) and (21) together imply that
³
bx(~xgt; Ág)¡ cx(~xgt; Ág)
´





< (bx(~xbt; Áb)¡ cx(~xbt; Áb)) :
Therefore, ~xgt > ~xbt since (a) bx(~xgt; Ág)¡ cx(~xgt; Ág) < 0; (b) bxx(:)¡ cxx(:) < 0; and
(c)
³
bx(x; Ág)¡ cx(x; Ág)
´
> (bx(x; Áb)¡ cx(x; Áb)) for all x:
II) ~xbt < x¤b : Consider a small change (dxgt; dxbt) and evaluate the objective






b) = 0; and R
0
t(~xbt) > 0; the
value of the objective function decreases with xbt at (x¤g; x
¤
b). Therefore, ~xbt < x
¤
b :
III) We cannot determine whether ~xgt > or < x¤g because the sign of the cross
partial derivative Wgb is ambiguous in general.
9.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proof. The result on rents follows from the binding constraints (11) and (12). Using
the de…nitions of S(:) from (2) rent from (8), and the fact that (11) and (12) hold as
equalities, we can rewrite the purchaser’s problem as the unconstrained problem,
max
xgo;xbo
[n(¹x(xgo; xbo))S(xgo; xbo)¡ ¼Ro(xbo)] ; (22)
or, by the de…nition of W (:) from (3),
max
xgo;xbo
[W (xgo; xbo)¡ ¼Ro(xbo)]
The …rst order conditions de…ning the optimal choices can be written,
Wg(~xgo; ~xbo) = 0; (23)
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Wb(~xgo; ~xbo)¡ ¼R0o(~xbo) = 0 (24)
The rest of the proof follows that of proposition 1. However,it is useful to note that







This implies that Ro(:) is larger and increases faster than Rt(:) for each xb:
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